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Theil’s multiplicative factor decomposition 
A B S T R A C T   
Distribution of natural resources is considered to be a key aspect in ensuring the success of conservation policies. 
The Common Fisheries Policy, implemented by the European Union (EU), is an example of long-term interna-
tional cooperation for sustainability of the marine environment. Nonetheless, continued enforcement of the 
policy is threatened by its insufficient effectiveness in restoring fish stocks and the tensions that have arisen over 
unequal distribution of benefits. Recent adoption of the Blue Growth Strategy represents an additional challenge 
for EU fisheries, since it encourages new alternative economic activities. The present analysis aims to identify 
ways of enhancing the sustainability of EU fisheries while achieving greater equity in resource distribution and 
maintaining the activity of the fishing industry, an important staple of many coastal communities in the EU. To 
this end, the study decomposes heterogeneity amongst per capita landing rates of EU Member States. A number 
of findings from the decompositions used may be highlighted. Firstly, most of the heterogeneity in per-capita 
landing rates between Member States occurs within the main EU fishing areas, especially FAO Areas 27 and 
37. Secondly, fishing production factors affect per-capita landing heterogeneity to a different extent in Areas 27 
and 37. The only exception is the number of fishers, the factor contributing most to heterogeneity in both areas. 
Technological factors appear to diminish heterogeneity in Area 27 whilst positively contributing to heterogeneity 
in Area 37. More efficient fleet adjustments could be designed taking into account these contributions by pro-
duction factors to heterogeneity within fisheries.   
1. Introduction 
Egalitarian international distribution of resources allows global 
growth to be fostered [1] by providing the poorest countries with in-
centives to invest in human capital and entrepreneurial activities [2,3]; 
it also foments well-being by reducing the level of poverty and food 
insecurity as established in the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals [4,5]. Furthermore, the distribution of scarce natural resources 
may be crucial to the success of the international agreements needed to 
ensure their conservation [6–8]. Ensuring more equitable distribution of 
resources through the establishment of property rights may threaten 
sustainability if exploitation of those resources is not properly regulated 
[9–11]. However, very dissimilar exploitation patterns may make it 
harder for countries to accept the same responsibility for preserving 
resources [12–15]. 
The development of appropriate ownership schemes has helped to 
prevent over-exploitation of common-pool resources [16]. In fisheries, 
distributional concerns and economic inefficiency are linked to in-
adequacy of property rights [17,18]. Consequently, developments in 
ownership arrangements have become a key ingredient in fisheries 
management. The 1982 declaration of the Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZs), which recognized the jurisdiction of coastal countries over the 
natural resources in their 200-nautical-miles adjacent waters [19], may 
be considered as a global system that grants property rights to countries. 
Creation of the EEZs helped to rebuild certain stocks, especially in 
countries with science-based fisheries management [20] and to protect 
fisheries from unauthorized fishing [21]. From this perspective, EEZs 
may be viewed as a form of community quota, since only domestic 
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vessels are allowed to access coastal fisheries. However the area to be 
managed is so large that fisheries authorities have to implement more 
disaggregated rights-permit schemes, for instance, individual transfer 
quotas (ITQs) and territorial use rights for fishing (TURFs) programs, 
which in most cases take into consideration social and equity criteria, in 
addition to conservation and efficiency benchmarks [22,23]. 
In this context, management of the European Union’s fisheries may 
be considered to be a quite relevant case study since it involves several 
countries committed to a cooperative approach embodied in the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy (CFP). The CFP applies to all EU Member States 
(MSs), but only 22 of the 27 countries in the Union are coastal. Each 
coastal state has the right to manage natural resources in its EEZ, but 
under the CFP, the fishing area of all MSs is considered as a single zone. 
The main purpose of the CFP is to preserve fishing operations, fish 
consumption and the marine ecosystems in which EU fleets operate. To 
this end, the policy has been adapted over time and since the lastest 
reform in 2013 [24], it now covers aspects such as maximizing sus-
tainable yield exploitation for all stocks; reducing discards (the “Landing 
Obligation”); adapting capital-intensity to fishing opportunities; 
improving aquaculture to reduce reliance on wild fish and enhancing the 
role of scientific research in assessing sustainable fishery management. 
In addition to monitoring the inputs used by countries (such as 
maximum number of vessels or kilowatts), the CFP establishes fishing 
quotas, i.e. the quantity of fish of each species that can be extracted by 
each MS, in order to balance fishing operations and fishing opportu-
nities. These quotas are allocated to each country as a fixed percentage 
of the total allowable catches (TACs). TACs are set by the Council of 
Fisheries Ministers, based on scientific advice provided by the Interna-
tional Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the Scientific, 
Technical and Economic Committee of Fisheries (STECF). The fixed 
percentages used to divide the TACs up amongst MSs are determined by 
the principle of Relative Stability, which gives priority to countries’ 
historical-fishing operations in each fishery [24–26]. In short, the CFP is 
aligned with the principles of conservation and efficiency of fisheries as 
well as being committed to the historical fishing rights of Member 
States. 
One of the ways in which MSs circumvent the principle of relative 
stability is by bringing influence to bear at the annual closed-door ne-
gotiations at which TACs are set for stocks of interest to them. [27] 
found that between 2011 and 2015, the TACs set were on average 20% 
annually above those proposed in the scientific advice. The MSs 
benefiting most from this surplus were Denmark and United Kingdom 
(in absolute terms) and Spain and Portugal (in relative terms). The ri-
gidity of quota regulation has led to the emergence of two instruments 
enabling different fishing actors (Member States, Production Organiza-
tions and fishers) to adapt their fishing operations to their specific needs 
or preferences. On the one hand, TACs may be landed by foreign oper-
ators using domestic vessels under domestic rights, a practice known as 
“quota hopping” [28]. On the other hand, fishing actors may transfer 
TACs between them (“quota swapping”) [29]. According to [28], 20% of 
TACs in 2013 were reallocated through international quota swapping. 
Taking into account the distributional perspective of the CFP, this 
article seeks to analyze how landings in EU waters are distributed among 
MSs. Specifically, the analysis is based on data on the value of landings 
from 23 MSs between 2008 and 2016 (including the UK as one of the 
MSs during that period). Although some of the countries considered are 
characterized by having a set of data-poor indicators [30], there are two 
key advantages to considering this set of countries. Firstly, relevant 
defining variables for the countries’ fleets, such as number of fishers, 
which are not available in global terms for recent periods, can be entered 
in the analysis. Secondly, an analysis of the distribution of landings 
within the EU measured by value shows the particularities of fishing 
management in the region. In this regard, the distributional analysis was 
performed by distinguishing the origin of landings between fishing 
areas, considering those from the Northeast Atlantic, Baltic and North 
Seas areas (FAO area 27, hereinafter ATW) and those from the 
Mediterranean and Black Seas (FAO area 37, hereinafter MBS) which 
represent 62% and 22% of the total value of EU landings, retrospec-
tively, for the period studied. This distinction is relevant, not only 
because the decline in MBS fisheries contrasts with the improvement 
observed in trends in ATW fisheries [31], but also because the nature of 
these fisheries is conditioned by differences in the biological charac-
teristics of their ecosystems, the implementation of CFP and their cul-
tural heritage [32]. 
A large body of literature already exists on the international distri-
bution of the use of natural resources and environmental capacity, much 
of it addressed using analyses of inequality metrics [33–37]. This liter-
ature has focused to a lesser extent on fishery resources. In particular, 
the distributional effects generated by specific right-based management 
systems in fisheries such as ITQs have been assessed by quantifying 
changes in the distribution of landings and fishing incomes among 
fishers and boat owners by using inequality metrics [38–43]. Another set 
of articles uses the same approach to analyze the distributional effects of 
the introduction of ITQs on the industry. In this context, the ownership 
of catch rights has been concentrated amongst a few large fishers and 
companies, increasing their market power in, for example, New Zealand 
commercial fishing [44] and the Icelandic fisheries [45,46]. From a 
global perspective, [47] show that high sea catches are very unevenly 
distributed among countries; most of the heterogeneity observed is due 
to dissimilarities in the technological capacity and number of fishers of 
countries, rather than any biological idiosyncrasies of the fishing areas 
harvested. 
The analysis presented here also follows this international perspec-
tive and has a dual objective. On the one hand, it seeks to ascertain to 
what extent the heterogeneity observed in the distribution of landings 
(in value per capita) between MSs can be explained by differences be-
tween the fishing areas of origin (e.g., species diversity, climate, nutri-
ents, implementation of the CFP and other productivity factors) and to 
what extent by differences between different fishing actors in these areas 
(e.g., technological features of the fleet such as gear length, power, and 
distance and fishers capacities). This issue is addressed by decomposing 
inequality in landings into its so-called between-within components. At 
the same time, the analysis seeks also to determine the technological 
reasons for the uneven distribution of landings (in value per capita) 
between the countries within each fishing area (ATW and MBS). To that 
end inequality in landings is decomposed into the sum of several com-
ponents representing the fishing production factors of the countries. 
Traditionally, catches from fisheries are represented as the result of 
production factors such as labor and capital services which may also 
include energy [48]. This study focuses mainly on the role of the tech-
nological features characterizing fleets. Specifically, it considers the 
following factor drivers related to different aspects of fishing fleets: 
technological productivity (measured by landings per kWt of engine 
power), technical progress (measured by engine power in kWt per 
vessel), capital-intensity (measured by vessels per fisher) and fishing 
labor (measured as the percentage of fishers in the total labor force). The 
breakdown in the inequality indexes set out in [49] is used to account for 
the technological changes observed in the links between the production 
factors defined. 
In view of the characteristics of the EU fleet, it is pertinent to study 
the role of production factors in determining the distribution of landings 
among MSs. In 2016, the EU fleet comprised more than 65,000 active 
vessels, of which 75% were classed as small-scale coastal vessels, 24.6% 
as large-scale vessels and the remaining remaining 0.4% as distant-water 
vessels [50]. Despite the prevalence of small-scale coastal fisheries 
(SSCF) in terms of vessels, this segment accounts for just 8% of total 
gross tonnage and about 30% of engine power [50,51]. From the 
perspective of labor input, based on a selection of case studies, [52] find 
that SSCFs in the EU are made up of vessels with smaller crews than 
larger-scale fleets, although global employment in SSCF amounts to a 
similar level to that of large-scale fleets. These findings are corroborated 
in [50], which quantifies the fishers of SSCF as 51% of the EU fleet and 
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41% in terms of full-time equivalent units. The relevance of the SSCF 
also differs between the fishing areas considered; while 22% of the value 
of catches captured in MBS came from SSCFs, in ATW they represented 
only 12% of its total value [50]. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the 
CFP in ensuring the sustainable activity amongst this type of fleet, as 
required by United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14.b [4] has 
been questioned [52–56]. 
Since 2012 Blue Growth has been part of the European Commission 
Strategy. This plan aims to foster growth in maritime sectors with 
innovative potential, such as ocean energy, aquaculture, tourism, 
biotechnology and marine mineral resources, while keeping traditional 
and new exploitation of the environment within sustainable limits; and 
both public and private institutions of the MSs are expected to cooperate 
in the interests of efficient management of marine resources [57,58]. 
From the perspective of the economic literature, the theoretical and 
empirical evidences on the relationship between growth and inequality 
(generally measured in terms of income) are mixed. In general terms, it 
is accepted that inequality has positive short-term effects on economic 
performance whereas long-term effects are negative [3,59]. Likewise, 
heterogeneity in the use of marine resources may, at least in the long 
term, be expected to affect the blue growth strategy. In this regard, 
although heterogeneity in landings between countries is not a prominent 
issue in the blue growth strategy, it is relevant to study its connection 
with the underlying productivity factors in order to understand and 
assess the programs in terms of the jobs generated within the EU marine 
sectors. 
Although the per-capita value of landings became more uniform 
across MSs between 2008 and 2016 [60], heterogeneity still causes 
tension between them. Indeed, it appears to have played a significant 
role in the UK’s decision to leave the European Union [61–64]. At the 
same time, major divergences may be found in the fleets and fishing 
operations of different MSs [60]. The present analysis focuses on two 
main aspects. The first objective is to detect whether heterogeneity in 
the per-capita value of landings between MSs is caused by differences in 
the harvesting area (between heterogeneity) or by the dissimilar char-
acteristics of the fishing actors operating in each area (within heteroge-
neity). The second objective is to identify the main production factors 
leading to heterogeneity in the per-capita value of landings between 
countries fishing in the same area. The main results show that most of 
the heterogeneity arises within fishing areas. The number of fishers 
appears to have been the greatest contributor to per-capita heteroge-
neity in landings amongst MSs between 2008 and 2016 in the ATW and 
MBS areas. The effect of technological factors varies within the areas. In 
the ATW area, technological factors contribute to a decrease in 
per-capita landing heterogeneity. By contrast, in the MBS area, tech-
nological factors augment per-capita landing heterogeneity. Changes in 
the contribution of technological factors to heterogeneity within each 
area reflect technological advances in fishing and a reduction in fleet 
size in Europe in recent years [65,66]. 
The remainder of this analysis is structured as follows. Section 2 
briefly describes the distribution of landings per capita and fishing 
production factors between MSs and fishing areas. Section 3 sets out the 
Theil-0 index used to measure heterogeneity and two decomposition 
used for the analysis: the between-within areas decomposition and the 
multiplicative factor decomposition. The results of the analysis are 
detailed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes and discusses the main 
findings. 
2. Description of data 
Data on landings and the production factors of countries are drawn 
from the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries 
[60]. Population data is taken from the World Bank [67]. The data 
available on fishing activity makes it possible to cover 23 coastal MSs 
out of a total of 28 EU MSs for the period 2008–2016. The United 
Kingdom has been included as it was still a MS during that period. 
For the purpose of this study, landings are measured in terms of the 
value of landings, and thus, unless otherwise indicated, any use of the 
term “landings” henceforth will refer to the value of landings. Since 
distributional concerns are the main focus, all recorded landings are 
considered, regardless of their future use (consumption or trade). 
2.1. Distribution of landings between EU countries 
Complete homogenization in the distribution of the value of landings 
occurs when countries have the same percentages of landings as popu-
lation. As shown in Fig. 1, countries’ shares in overall landings differ 
considerably from their respective population shares. These asymme-
tries appear to have persisted throughout the period analyzed. 
In particular, countries such as Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain have overall landings that exceed their share of the total 
population, and some have benefited greatly from negotiation of the 
TACs by the Council of Fisheries Ministers [27]. By contrast, the overall 
landing shares of Germany, Poland and Romania are lower than their 
relative population shares. In these countries, the role of commercial 
fisheries is small, in economic terms, although inland and recreational 
fishing and SSCF are increasing in significance [68–70]. 
2.2. Distribution of landings between fishing areas 
The majority of EU fishing activity is concentrated in FAO Areas 27 
and 37 [50], which accounted for around 62% and 22% of the value of 
Fig. 1. Landings value and population of coastal MS (2008, 2012, 2016).  
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EU landings between 2008 and 2016, respectively. Nevertheless, their 
contributions to the value of the landings of MSs differ considerably. In 
this regard, Fig. 2 shows a clear distinction between those countries that 
border Atlantic waters (Northern EU countries, whose income from 
fishing activity comes from FAO Area 27) and those bordering the 
Mediterranean and Black Seas (Southern EU countries, whose income 
from fishing comes from FAO Area 37). Only a few countries bordering 
both the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea (i.e. France, Portugal 
and Spain) benefit from harvesting in both of these FAO areas. 
Only a limited number of countries within the EU (i.e. Spain, France, 
Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Portugal, the Netherlands and Germany) 
appear to have enjoyed any significant income from fishing activity in 
other FAO areas (Other Fishing Regions or OFRs) during the period 
under analysis. Within this group there are two clearly differentiated 
types of catch: on the one hand, catches from the outermost regions, i.e. 
the EEZs of the Canary Islands (Spain), Azores and Madeira (Portugal) 
and the French overseas regions (Guyana, Martinique, Guadalupe, 
Reunion and Mayotte); and on the other hand, catches from long- 
distance fisheries in regions outside EU waters [50]. The dataset for 
the present analysis provides complete information for more than 80% 
of 2016 EU landings from OFR [50]. In particular, landings from these 
areas are considered for Spain, France, Lithuania, Portugal and Italy. See 
A for more detailed information on the origin of OFR landings for these 
countries. 
2.3. Multiplicative factor decomposition of landings per capita 
The IPAT identity describes the multiplicative contribution of pop-
ulation (P), affluence (A) and technology (T) on environmental impact 
(I) [71,72]. Environmental impact may be expressed in terms of resource 
depletion or accumulation of emissions; population refers to the size of 
the human population; affluence refers to the level of consumption by 
that population; and technology refers to the processes used to obtain 
resources and transform them into useful goods and wastes. 
Likewise, the per-capita value of landings for any country is 
expressed as the result of the interaction of various input factors. In 
particular, the value of countries’ per-capita landings (Impact) can be 
expressed as the product of the technological productivity and progress 
of their fleets (Technology), their capital-intensity (Affluence) and the 
percentage of their population engaged in fishing operations (Popula-

















where Engine power refers to total kilowatts (kWt), Vessels to the 
number of units used in commercial fishing and Fishers to the number of 
fishing workers; all in reference to the fleet of country i. 
The Landingsi / Engine poweri ratio denotes the productivity of the 
aggregated fleet in country i. In fisheries, this is usually referred to as 
LPUE (landings per unit of effort) [50]. Fishing effort can be measured 
either by the natural characteristics of fishing vessels (such as engine 
power) or by fishing operations (for example, number of days fishing) 
[73]. This ratio represents the productivity of fleets considering the first 
of these criteria. 
The Engine poweri / Vesselsi ratio reflects the average engine power of 
vessels in country i. A positive change in this indicator means that on 
average, vessels become more powerful; this ratio is therefore associated 
with the technological level of the fleet of country i. 
The Vesselsi / Fishersi ratio measures the relationship between phys-
ical capital and labor for the aggregated fleet of country i. Higher values 
for this ratio indicate that fleets are more capital-intensive, a factor that 
is associated with smaller scale fleets as more vessels are employed per 
fisher. This is a characteristic of less industrial fleets. By contrast, lower 
values of this ratio are associated with larger scale fleets since fewer 
vessels are used per fisher. 
The last ratio, Fishersi / Populationi, shows the scale of the fishing 
sector in the labor force of economy i. 
To simplify the comments on analyses and their results, the above 
terms are referred as technological productivity (Landings per Kilowatts, 
LPK), technical progress (Kilowatts per Vessel, KPV), capital-intensity 
(Vessels per fisher, VPF) and labor participation (Fishers per popula-
tion, FPP). Applying this notation, the decomposition can be rewritten 
as: 
LPCi = LPKi⋅KPVi⋅VPFi⋅FPPi.
The countries in the sample show great diversity in the production 
factors defined above (LPK, KPV, VPF and FPP). Fig. 3 shows the average 
use of these production factors by MSs. In particular, the distribution of 
the factors is shown in three scenarios: the ATW scenario, with the 
distribution of factors engaged exclusively with fishing in FAO area 27; 
the MBS scenario, with the distribution of factors engaged exclusively 
with fishing in FAO area 37; and the EU scenario with the overall dis-
tribution of factors. 
The distribution of technological productivity shows that average 
returns from fishing differed significantly between countries in the 
Fig. 2. Share of the landings value from each area.  
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Fig. 3. Distribution of fishing production factors across EU coastal countries. Average during 2008 and 2016. EU: factors used in all areas; ATW: factors used in FAO 
area 27; MBS: factors used in FAO area 37. Color bar indicates with yellow low numbers and red high values of each production factor. 
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period analyzed, ranging from almost 73 to around 2060 Euros per 
kilowatt (Fig. 3a). The subtle division between Western and Eastern EU 
countries in the general framework becomes noticeable when we 
examine the ATW and MBS areas separately (Fig. 3b and c). Here, 
Western EU countries can clearly be seen to enjoy a much higher average 
return than Eastern EU countries. 
Central EU countries appear to have employed more high-powered 
vessels in fishing than other EU countries during the period under 
analysis (Fig. 3d), especially in the ATW area (Fig. 3e). In the MBS area 
(Fig. 3f), average use of technical progress is a differentiating charac-
teristic of Western EU countries, which use more high-powered vessels. 
The distribution of capital-intensity shows that Western EU countries 
use more industrial fleets than most of Eastern EU countries (Fig. 3g, h, 
and i). As for the respective areas, the use of industrial fleets is greater in 
MBS area than in ATW area. In particular, the average number of fishers 
by vessel in MBS ranges between 1 and 12 whereas in ATW area ranges 
between 1 and 5. 
Compared to other regions, Europe has one of the lowest percentages 
of overall population working in fishing [74]. Within the EU, the per-
centage of the population employed in the sector varies markedly from 
country to country (Fig. 3j, k, and l). In general, the largest ratios of 
fishers-per-capita are found in the Southern countries. 
Fig. 4 shows the use of resources by each country in the ATW and 
MBS areas. Countries are classed into three groups depending on the 
average use of the corresponding production factor in each area between 
2008 and 2016. If its average use of a certain factor is in the lowest third 
of the distribution, the country is assigned to the First tercile (1st tercile) 
category. A country is placed in the Second tercile (2nd tercile) category 
when it is in the middle third of the distribution. Finally, the country is 
placed in the Third tercile (3rd tercile) category if it is in the highest third 
of the distribution. 
Given that no common pattern can be drawn, rather than focusing on 
each country, details are given of those with the highest and lowest 
landings per capita. Denmark, which is one of the countries with the 
highest rate of landings per capita, harvests only in the ATW area. 
Within this area, Denmark stands in the highest third of the distribution 
for technological productivity, technical progress and capital-intensity. 
The only exception is the ratio of fishers per capita, where it stands in 
the medium range. This may be explained by the major role of industrial 
vessels in Denmark, which is characterized by being one of the largest 
producers of fishmeal and fish oil in Europe. In 2016, 97% of landings 
were caught by semi-industrial or industrial vessels, representing 
around 25% of active vessels in the Danish fishing fleet [75]. Ireland is 
another example of a country fishing only in the ATW area with a large 
ratio of landings per capita. Ireland’s technological productivity and 
technical progress lie in the middle third, but in terms of 
capital-intensity and fishing labor per capita it is in the top third of 
distribution. Greece is also among the countries with the highest ratio of 
landings per capita. However, the country’s fishing activity is limited to 
the MBS area. Within this area, Greece is in the lowest third of technical 
progress and capital-intensity, in the middle third for technological 
productivity and in the highest third for fishing labor per capita. 
Portugal, one of the countries with the highest landings-per-capita ra-
tios, has fishing activity in both the ATW and MBS areas. However, its 
profile varies from one area to another. In the ATW area, Portugal is in 
the highest third of fishing labor per capita, in the middle third of 
technological productivity and capital-intensity and in the lowest third 
in technical progress. In the MBS area, Portugal is in the highest third of 
capital productivity and technical progress, the middle third of 
capital-intensity and the lowest third of fishing labor per capita. Like 
Portugal, Spain is among the countries with the highest levels of land-
ings per capita in the ATW and MBS areas. However, there is less 
disparity in its profile in the two areas. Spain is in the highest third of 
technological productivity and fishing labor per capita and in the lowest 
third of capital-intensity. In technical progress, the country is in the 
highest third in the MBS area, but in the lowest third in the ATW area. 
Germany has one of the lowest landings-per-capita levels of all coun-
tries. It fishes in the ATW area and its fleet is characterized by high levels 
of technological productivity and capital-intensity, medium levels of 
technical progress and low levels of fishing labor per capita. Poland, 
which is similar to Germany in terms of low landings per capita and 
fishing activity location, belongs to the lowest third of technological 
productivity, capital-intensity and fishing labor per capita. Romania is 
also among the countries with low landings per capita. In contrast to 
Germany and Poland, Romania’s fishing activity is confined to the MBS 
area. Within this area, Romania is in the medium third of technological 
productivity and capital-intensity and in the lowest third in technical 
progress and fishing labor per capita. 
3. Methodology for measuring heterogeneity 
3.1. Measuring heterogeneity 
The inequality metrics approach has been used to quantify hetero-
geneity in the distribution of the variables of interest. In particular, this 
study measures heterogeneity using the second measure of Theil pro-
posed by [76], also called the Mean Logarithmic Deviation index. This 
index can be derived from the Generalized Entropy family [77,78] for a 
parameter value equal to zero (α = 0). 
For the purpose of this study, this inequality measure is referred to as 
the Theil-0 index, denoted by T, and its application to the distribution of 
landings per capita (LPC) can be expressed as 
Fig. 4. Relevance of production factors by fishing areas and countries. LPK (Landings per Kilowatt), KPV (Kilowatts per vessel), VPF (Vessels per fisher), FPP (Fishers 
per population). 
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where the subindex i refers to each of the n countries, pi weights the 
observations of countries according to their share of the total population 
and LPC refers to the overall average for landings per capita. The greater 
the value of the index, the greater the disparities between the fishing 
areas considered. In the extreme case where landings per capita of 
countries are exactly the same, this index takes a value of T = 0. Thus, 
values closer to zero reflect more even distributions of landings per 
capita. 
The Theil-0 index satisfies the basic properties of anonymity, popu-
lation and scale invariance and the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle. 
Moreover, apart from the absolute Gini index, this index is the only 
measure that respects both the principle of transfer and the principle of 
monotonicity in distance, for which reason Shorrocks [77] argued that 
this index is the “most satisfactory of the decomposable measures” because 
it unequivocally decomposes overall inequality into the contribution 
from the inequality within subgroups and that from the inequality be-
tween subgroups, for any partition of the population. 
3.2. Decomposition of heterogeneity by fishing areas 
One of the advantages of using the Theil-0 index is that it can be 
usefully decomposed, in order to evaluate the impact of the between- 
within components whenever the population can be partitioned into 
exclusive subgroups. This is the case of this study where the population 
(landings) are available at country level and can be sorted by fishing 
area of origin. Given this property, it is possible to quantify how much of 
the observed heterogeneity in the distribution of the landings can be 
explained by differences between the fishing areas of origin and how 
much by differences between the fishing actors operating within these 
areas. Fig. 5 represents the logic behind this decomposition. 
Formally, for the application of this study, the Theil-0 index can be 
decomposed as. 















where pg is the proportion of population attributed to the area g, LPCg 
is the average for landings per capita in area g, and T(LPCg) is the Theil- 
0 index calculated considering exclusively the landings in area g, being g 
= {ATW, MSB, Others} (more details in B). For the purposes of allocating 
the population of each country to fishing areas an equal distribution 
principle is assumed (see more details in [47]). 
Note that the weights in the within-subgroup add up to one and do 
not depend on the mean of per capita landings for the area. This char-
acteristic has been referred to as path-independent decomposability 
[79] and means that the additive decomposition of the index is inde-
pendent of the path followed to define the two components. The above 
characterization shows that the overall heterogeneity is the sum of the 
weighted sum of heterogeneity within areas and the heterogeneity be-
tween areas. 
The terms TW and TB are the within and between components, 
respectively. The within component accounts for heterogeneity inside 
each area and the between component accounts for heterogeneity be-
tween areas. In this study, landings are available at country level and can 
be classified by fishing area of origin. Given that the fishing areas 
considered (ATW, MBS and the remainder) are so dissimilar, it is of 
interest to ascertain what proportion of the heterogeneity observed is 
due to differences within and between fishing areas. 
Fig. 5. The logic behind the between-within heterogeneity decomposition. Landings of every country can be assigned to one of the fishing areas. The between 
component represents the heterogeneity of landings between the fishing areas (between countries of different colors) and the within component represents the 
heterogeneity of landings within the areas (within countries with the same color). 
Table 1 
Pearson correlation between production factors.   
Area 27 Area 37  
LPK KPV VPF FPP LPK KPV VPF FPP 
LPK  1.00  0.32  -0.38  -0.23  1.00  0.58  -0.73  -0.05 
KPV  0.32  1.00  -0.31  -0.46  0.58  1.00  -0.54  0.06 
VPF  -0.38  -0.31  1.00  -0.16  -0.73  -0.54  1.00  -0.25 
FPP  -0.23  -0.46  -0.16  1.00  -0.05  0.06  -0.25  1.00 
LPK (Landings per kilowatt), KPV (Kilowatts per vessel), VPF (Vessels per 
fisher), FPP (Fishers per population). 
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3.3. Factor decomposition in fishing areas 
When the value of per-capita landings is decomposed by input fac-
tors, as proposed in Section 2.3, it is of interest to study to what extent 
each factor contributes to heterogeneity in the distribution of landings 
between countries. 
If the production factors in the decomposition were independent of 
one other, the heterogeneity of landings per capita estimated by the 
Theil-0 index (T(LPC)) would be equal to the sum of the Theil-0 index 
applied to the four production factors (see C), i.e. 
T(LPC) = T(LPK) + T(KPV) + T(VPF) + T(FPP).
However, the factors are dependent by construction. Table 1 shows 
the empirical Pearson correlations between the factors for the two main 
fishing areas considered. Almost all have a negative relationship. The 
only common exception between areas is the link between technological 
productivity and technical progress, which may indicate that more 
technologically advanced vessels have greater capacities and can seek 
more productive areas further away [65,66]. The large magnitude of the 
negative relationship between technical progress and capital-intensity 
and between technical progress and fishing labor between areas re-
inforces the idea that two kinds of fleet coexists [66]: one more artisanal 
(using more capital and labor, but with less technical progress) and the 
other more technologically oriented (less numerous, but with more 
technical progress). In the MBS area, the correlation between techno-
logical productivity and capital-intensity is also notable, suggesting that 
increases (decreases) in technological productivity are associated with 
decreases (increases) in capital-intensity. Consistently with [50,65], this 
shows that industrial vessels (with larger crews per vessel) are associ-
ated with larger fishing returns. The relationship between 
capital-intensity and fishing labor per capita reflects the substitutability 
of these two factors. 
Thus, in order to analyze the importance of each production factor in 
the heterogeneity of landings distribution it is necessary to take into 
account the interrelationships between the factors. Moreover, given the 
differences between correlations in the two areas the factor decompo-
sition for the areas is expected to be different. To that end, the Theil 
decomposition proposed by [49] was applied to the data set for the ATW 
and MBS areas. Broadly speaking, this procedure decomposes the Theil-0 
index as the sum of the index for each factor considered plus an addi-
tional element reflecting the interrelations between the factors. 
Formally, the Theil-0 index associated with the heterogeneity of landings 







where the overline symbol on a variable reflects the weighted 
average of the corresponding variable for all countries. Each of the first 
four summands reflects the direct impact of each factor on landings 
heterogeneity and the fifth summand represents the indirect impact of 
all factors together due to their interrelationship. [49] show that this 
element can be expressed in terms of covariances between factors. See C 
for a full characterization. 
4. Results 
4.1. Heterogeneity in fishing areas 
Table 2 shows the between-within decomposition of heterogeneity in 
landings-per-capita among coastal MSs grouped by fishing areas (ATW, 
MBS and Others) and evolution of these figures from 2008 to 2016. The 
results show that landings per capita are more heterogeneously 
distributed within fishing areas than between them. This implies that 
ecological idiosyncrasies of fishing areas such as species composition of 
fish stocks, biodiversity, nutrients availability, temperature, climate 
conditions, etc. (underlying the between component) play a minor role 
in landings per capita heterogeneity amongst MSs when compared to the 
effects of using dissimilar fleets by countries harvesting in the same area 
(producing the within component). 
Heterogeneity in the landings per capita appears to have decreased 
by around 27% from 2008 to 2016, mainly due to the observed decrease 
in heterogeneity within fishing areas. This suggests that landings per 
capita between MSs have become more alike due to the homogenization 
of their fleets, which may be driven by the reduction in fleet capacity 
projected in the CFP [24] as well as improvements in fishing technolo-
gies [66]. Despite the decrease over time, heterogeneity within fishing 
areas represents more than 90% of the total heterogeneity in landings 
per capita from 2008 to 2016. 
The contribution of each area to the within heterogeneity can also be 
observed to be significantly different (second block in Table 2). In 
particular, the ATW area accounts for more than 60% of total within 
heterogeneity. The MBS area represents around 40% of total within 
heterogeneity while the contribution of Other areas remains below 1% 
throughout most of the period analyzed. Between 2008 and 2016, het-
erogeneity within ATW and MBS areas decreased. Nevertheless, the 
Table 2 
Distribution of landings per capita among countries and fishing areas. Heterogeneity decomposition in between-within components.  
Year Theil Decomposition Contribution to the within heterogeneity   
Between Within ATW area MBS area Other areas  
Abs. Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %  
2008  0.86  0.04  4.31  0.82  95.69  0.49  59.11  0.34  40.78  0.00  0.11  
2009  0.89  0.05  5.68  0.84  94.32  0.49  58.27  0.35  41.66  0.00  0.08  
2010  0.75  0.03  3.73  0.72  96.27  0.41  57.36  0.30  41.91  0.01  0.74  
2011  0.69  0.03  4.17  0.66  95.83  0.41  61.37  0.25  37.97  0.00  0.66  
2012  0.68  0.04  5.40  0.64  94.60  0.37  58.05  0.26  40.88  0.01  1.08  
2013  0.66  0.05  6.96  0.62  93.04  0.37  60.07  0.24  39.05  0.01  0.88  
2014  0.65  0.05  7.08  0.61  92.92  0.38  62.97  0.22  36.13  0.01  0.90  
2015  0.59  0.03  5.45  0.56  94.55  0.37  66.44  0.18  32.89  0.00  0.66  
2016  0.63  0.03  5.08  0.60  94.92  0.38  63.10  0.21  36.01  0.01  0.89  
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previous pattern was maintained during the period under analysis. 
The major role played by fleet dissimilarities in explaining landings- 
per-capita heterogeneity between MSs justifies further exploration of the 
production factors leading to such heterogeneity. 
4.2. Factor decomposition in fishing areas 
Given that ATW and MBS fishing areas represent most of the 
landings-per-capita heterogeneity, this Section focuses on the factor 
decomposition of the heterogeneity found in these areas. 
Fig. 6 illustrates the decomposition of the landings-per-capita het-
erogeneity for each fishing area. The factor decompositions reveal that 
the reasons for the landings-per-capita heterogeneity vary between 
areas. The only similarity found in the decomposition of heterogeneity 
in the two areas is the major role played by fishing labor per capita. 
Indeed, the dissimilarities in the number of fishers per capita between 
MSs is the reason for most of the heterogeneity found in their landings 
per capita, regardless of the area harvested. Heterogeneity in the tech-
nical progress of fleets is the second major reason for landings-per-capita 
heterogeneity in the ATW area. However, technological productivity 
makes the second largest contribution to landings-per-capita heteroge-
neity in MBS area. Similarly, the interactions between production fac-
tors affect the heterogeneity in each area differently. Thus, interactions 
significantly reduce landings-per-capita heterogeneity in the ATW area, 
while having scarcely any effect on landings-per-capita heterogeneity in 
the MBS area. The overall heterogeneity in landings per capita of each 
area can be obtained by adding the contributions of production factors 
and their interactions. A comparison of total heterogeneity shows that 
landings per capita are more unevenly distributed between countries in 
the MBS area. 
The direct and indirect effect of each factor on overall heterogeneity 
of landings per capita cannot be quantified in any straightforward way 
given the dependency between the production factors. Since there is no 
single way of distributing the indirect impact between factors [80], it is 
frequently distributed equally amongst them [81]. Following this pro-
cedure, Table 3 shows the percentage contribution of each production 
factor to the heterogeneity in landings per capita in the ATW and MBS 
areas over the period analyzed. 
The heterogeneity in the number of fishers per capita generates most 
of the heterogeneity in the per-capita landings between MSs. The impact 
of this factor on heterogeneity of landings rose considerably from 2008 
to 2016. In particular, the contribution of fishing labor per capita to 
landing heterogeneity increased by 18% and 40% respectively in ATW 
and MBS. Technical progress also positively affects landings heteroge-
neity in both areas. However, its contribution decreased over the period 
analyzed. The contribution of technological productivity and capital- 
intensity to landings heterogeneity is entirely different in each area. In 
ATW, these factors contributed negatively to landings-per-capita het-
erogeneity during the period analyzed. By contrast, these factors 
increased landing heterogeneity in the MBS area, especially technolog-
ical productivity. The evolution of technological productivity, technical 
progress and capital-intensity led to the decrease observed in landings- 
per-capita heterogeneity in both areas from 2008 to 2016. This ho-
mogenization in technological factors reflects both the advances in 
fishing technology of MSs [66] and the limitation of the fleet capacity by 
the CFP [24]. 
Fig. 6. Decomposition of landings heterogeneity per capita by input factors: Technological productivity (Landings per Kilowatt, LPK), technical progress (Kilowatts 
per Vessel, KPV), capital-intensity (Vessels per fisher, VPF) and labor participation (Fishers per population, FPP). 
Table 3 
Percentage contribution of input factors to heterogeneity in landings per capita.   
ATW area MBS area 
Year LPK KPV VPF FPP LPK KPV VPF FPP  
2008 -2.41  7.24 -6.77  101.93  32.67  12.24  18.67  36.42  
2009 -8.91  3.42 -7.40  112.89  32.70  9.30  12.38  45.62  
2010 -8.17  5.24 -7.73  110.65  31.20  16.77  10.05  41.98  
2011 -12.47  3.79 -7.81  116.48  24.89  17.65  11.96  45.50  
2012 -14.92  3.93 -9.10  120.09  28.89  12.86  10.36  47.89  
2013 -16.15  2.88 -10.87  124.14  23.51  8.59  9.13  58.77  
2014 -11.88  4.54 -8.88  116.22  14.67  5.49  3.88  75.96  
2015 -11.92  3.65 -11.75  120.02  14.10  -0.04  -0.33  86.28  
2016 -11.69  2.11 -10.20  119.79  15.24  4.76  3.80  76.20 
LPK (Landings per kilowatt), KPV (Kilowatts per vessel), VPF (Vessels per fisher), FPP (Fishers per population). 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
The international distribution of resources has transcended the 
normative role traditionally assigned to it [82] and is recognized as a 
path for expanding global economic growth and enhancing well-being 
[1–4,83]. With regard to the international distribution of natural re-
sources, the consequences of their allocation additionally extend to the 
future availability of those resources [14,15,84] and among these nat-
ural resources, fisheries are no exception [85]. 
Fishery resources represent more than half of global fish production 
and are mostly used for human consumption. Fishing has very signifi-
cant socioeconomic effects, given that as at least 39 million people are 
estimated to be engaged in the industry [86]. Because the proportion of 
fish stocks exploited in excess of sustainable limits keeps increasing, 
international agreements need urgently to be implemented if fisheries 
are to be conserved [4,86]. However, inequity in the distribution of 
fishery resources undermines the cooperation required for the conser-
vation of the marine environment and in numerous cases at a global 
level leads to serious conflict [43,87–90]. 
The CFP implemented by the EU in the 1970s is an example of the 
international agreements that are required to target sustainable 
exploitation of fisheries. This framework sought to protect EU fisheries 
against overexploitation by controlling the fishing activity of MSs whilst 
also allowing them to obtain the best possible socioeconomic returns. 
Apart from the objective of decreasing overall fleet capacity, additional 
controls were established for each fishing area [24,25]. EU fishing ac-
tivity is mainly concentrated in the ATW and MBS areas, which 
accounted for more than 80% of the value of EU landings between 2008 
and 2016. Only a few MSs (i.e. Spain, France, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, 
Portugal, Netherlands and Germany) fished in Other areas during this 
period [60]. In ATW, fishing activity is mainly regulated through Total 
Allowable Catches (TACs), which specify the amount of each species 
that can be landed [26]. These TACs are set annually and split into 
quotas amongst MSs safeguarding the Principle of Relative Stability 
(PRS). The PRS prioritizes the fishing activity of countries that originally 
harvested a given area, in order to protect communities historically 
dependent on those resources [24,25,91]. By contrast, the most common 
regulations in the MBS area are the technical measures limiting certain 
fishing practices as well as the size, number and selectivity of fishing 
gears [92]. In general, the CFP appears to have succeed in reducing the 
EU’s fleet capacity. Between 2008 and 2018, the number of vessels fell 
by 5.5%. Simultaneously, the total power (kWt) and tonnage (GT) of the 
EU fishing fleet decreased by almost 17% and 10.5% respectively [93]. 
Nevertheless, the CFP has been called into question on multiple fronts. 
From the perspective of efficacy, the CFP guidelines have not been 
enough to safeguard the sustainability of all EU fish stocks [94–97]. 
From an institutional viewpoint, lack of transparency in definition of the 
regulation is an obstacle to stakeholder-approval and engagement [98, 
99]. Indeed, it has been claimed that asymmetries in the bargaining 
power of different countries and interest groups have been the main 
reason for inconsistencies in the distribution of CFP benefits [27,100]. In 
this sense, the undervaluation of small-scale fisheries, which represents 
75% of the active EU fleet and half of the EU fishing labor force [93], 
underlies the heterogeneous impact of different groups on the distri-
bution of benefits in the CFP and the CFP’s compliance with the goal of 
sustainable development [54,56]. From an ecological perspective, var-
iations in the distribution of fish stocks resulting from factors such as 
climate change threaten the current regulation on fishery resources 
allocation [101,102]. 
Moreover, the EU recently adopted several initiatives to promote 
Blue Growth. This project aims to increase the profitability of economic 
activities performed in marine areas by encouraging new technologies 
that will ensure the sustainability of the environment. Given their ca-
pacity for innovation and generation of new jobs, the sectors primarily 
considered in this initiative are: ocean energy generation, aquaculture, 
tourism, biotechnology and exploitation of marine mineral resources 
[57,58]. The omission of fishing from this plan, particularly the activity 
of the small-scale fleet, has raised concerns, due to the large reliance on 
fishery resources and the difficulties in re-allocating a labor force his-
torically dependent on fishing [5,48,103,104]. A lack of references to 
social aspects -such as equity- has also raised concerns that it may 
compromise sustainable development [5,85]. 
Within the European region, Brexit is a clear recent example of the 
relevance of equity in the distribution of resources. Unfavorable and 
unequal distribution of fishery resources in recent years was one of the 
key arguments for the UK’s leaving the European Union [61–64]. 
However, this is not the only case of tension associated with unequal 
distribution between MSs (and former MSs). [105] describes how 
different potential frameworks for regulating fishing activity under the 
CFP would affect either small-scale or industrial Spanish fisheries. Each 
of these fleet segments would prefer to see the regulation that is less 
harmful to their sector being implemented. Thus, implementation of a 
single policy favors one fleet segment over the other. [106] highlight the 
strong opposition to the CFP among small-scale Croatian fisheries, who 
claim that the regulation does not take into account geographical and 
socioeconomic idiosyncrasies in fishing areas and communities. They 
believe CFP benefits small-scale fisheries from other regions of Europe, 
but not their own. [107] compare different perceptions of CFP imple-
mentation in Great Britain and Germany. The results show very different 
expectations of CFP implementation between the two countries. 
Whereas in Great Britain the regulation is seen as a tool for fulfilling the 
needs of EU’s fisheries, in Germany the CFP is perceived as an instru-
ment for achieving their national goals. [108] outline the difficulties in 
allocating fishing activity among different stakeholders in the wild 
Atlantic salmon fisheries in Scotland, where each stakeholder believed 
themselves to have a better justification than the others for exploiting 
these scarce fishery resources. 
The present analysis aims to contribute to the reduction of fishing 
pressure pursued by the CFP while ensuring that fishing remains an 
active industry within the Blue Growth strategy. For this purpose, it 
focuses on two aspects. Firstly, it examines whether the heterogeneous 
distribution of the value of landings per capita between EU countries is 
motivated by idiosyncrasies in their harvesting areas or by differences in 
fishing activity. Secondly, it compares the contribution of each pro-
duction factor to the heterogeneity of the value of landings per capita of 
countries within the main EU fisheries (the ATW and the MBS areas). 
Combining these questions, the analysis presents evidence on ways in 
which fleet capacity reduction could be efficiently proposed in each of 
the main fishing areas while ensuring homogeneous distribution of 
fishery resources between countries. 
From a methodological viewpoint, the analysis is based on different 
decompositions of the Theil inequality index with a parameter value of 
0 [77,78]. Inequality metrics have already been implemented to analyze 
the distribution of multiple natural resources and environmental ca-
pacities such as CO2 emissions [109–111] coal use [34], water use [112] 
and ecological footprint [33]. By contrast, fewer studies exist based on 
inequality metrics in the field of fishery resources. Among such studies, 
the research question is very diverse in nature: the distribution of 
B. Inguanzo et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Marine Policy 132 (2021) 104679
11
resources in a particular fishery between different fleet segments and its 
relationship to total production [38]; the concentration of market power 
among a few large fishers caused by the ITQ system [44]; and the con-
sequences of diverse quota management methods for different fleet 
segments [40]. Despite applying the same type of methodology, the 
present analysis focuses on the heterogeneity between countries’ fleets 
rather than between fleet segments of the same fishery. In this regard, 
this analysis more closely resembles the study in [47], which examines 
inequality in high seas catches of countries in the period 1960–2014. 
Despite the decrease in such heterogeneity during the period analyzed, 
the authors found that at the end of the period, major dissimilarities 
persisted between countries, mainly due to technological factors. 
Following this evidence, the present analysis initially decomposes het-
erogeneity in the per-capita landings of MSs between and within major 
fishing areas. The two components of heterogeneity give an interesting 
insight into the reasons for total heterogeneity. On the one hand, het-
erogeneity between fishing areas reflects dissimilarities caused by the 
ecological features of each area. On the other hand, heterogeneity 
within fishing areas results from technological dissimilarities between 
fleets. After isolating the technological inequality, the multiplicative 
factor decomposition [49] was analyzed to estimate the contribution of 
each production factor (technological productivity, technical progress, 
capital-intensity and fishers per capita) to heterogeneity. 
The dataset used for this analysis contains information from 23 MSs 
for the period between 2008 and 2016 (including the United Kingdom, 
which was still a Member State during the period analyzed). Several 
additional aspects should be noted in consideration of this sample. 
Firstly, the availability of data for certain countries explains their later 
incorporation to the sample (France has been included from 2010 on-
wards, Croatia from 2012 onwards and Greece from 2014 onwards). 
Secondly, the poor quality of data-indicators for some of the countries is 
an obstacle to comparison [30]. Moreover, there are several factors that 
should be mentioned regarding the structure of the analysis and data 
used. Although the analysis considers the size of countries when 
weighting the allocation of resources by population, other criteria may 
underlie their current allocation of fishery resources [27,100]. Since the 
analysis focuses on the distribution of EU resources, it omits the oper-
ation of foreign countries in the same fishing areas, which may affect 
fishing activities in several dimensions such as the status of the stocks 
[113] and stakeholder participation in management [114]. 
The present analysis shows that more than 90% of the heterogeneity 
in landings per capita of MSs between 2008 and 2016 is due to het-
erogeneity in their fishing activity (the within component) rather than to 
particular features of their fishing areas (the between component). 
Heterogeneity in ATW represents the largest share of total within 
inequality (between 50% and 60%). By contrast, heterogeneity in areas 
other than ATW and MBS (Other Areas) represents less than 1% 
throughout most of the period analyzed. The negative trend in total 
heterogeneity reflects the fact that countries’ landings homogenized by 
more than 26% between 2008 and 2016. This reduction in heterogeneity 
was mainly caused by the decrease observed in heterogeneity within 
areas (almost 27%). The largest decrease in heterogeneity was observed 
in the MBS area, whose contribution to the within component was 
reduced by around 38%. In the ATW area, the contribution to the within 
component decreased by 22%. 
Since most of the value of EU landings during the period analyzed 
(around 84%) comes from the ATW and MBS areas, with Other Areas 
contributing in less than 1% to within heterogeneity, the multiplicative 
factor decomposition was only applied to the ATW and MBS areas. This 
decomposition reflects the fact that the contribution of production fac-
tors to heterogeneity within areas varies significantly. The only excep-
tion that can be appreciated in both areas is the large contribution of the 
labor factor. Indeed, fishers-per-capita is the largest contributor to the 
heterogeneity in both areas. In the ATW area, factors related to tech-
nology have a much smaller effect (technical progress) or even 
contribute negatively to heterogeneity (technological productivity and 
capital-intensity). In MBS, the second largest contributor to heteroge-
neity is the technological productivity although its contribution is far 
behind that of the labor factor. From 2008 to 2016, the contribution of 
the labor factor has increased noticeably in both areas. By contrast, the 
greatest decrease was experienced in the contribution of technological 
productivity. 
Based on the evidence of this analysis, the adjustment in fishing 
capacity sought by the CFP could be advanced by impacting the labor 
force and kWt per vessel in the ATW area and the labor force and 
technological productivity in the MBS area. Since lower fishing pressure 
is considered necessary for the conservation of marine ecosystems, these 
factors could be homogenized using countries with medium or low 
landings levels as a benchmark. Special care should be taken with regard 
to the fishing labor force factor, since the fishing industry is a major 
support for coastal communities. In absolute terms, the proportion of 
fishers in the labor force fell in all countries, mainly but not exclusively 
as a result of aging and a lack of replacement by younger workers. This 
has even led to the creation of professional fishing schools such as 
Enaleia in Greece and Instituto de Pesca Marítima del Atlántico in Spain. 
Nonetheless, this decrease is more significant, in relative terms, in 
Northern European countries where young fishers face difficulties 
entering the industry because of the large capital investment required in 
acquiring vessels and quotas [115] than in Southern countries. Consid-
ering equity in the burdens of conservation will help to avoid the ten-
sions that have arisen between countries under unequal distributions of 
resources, increasing the long-term probabilities of the CFP’s success. 
Implementing flexible quota managament [28,116] or increasing the 
involvement of fishers in the regulation process [99,117,118] could help 
achieve sustainability of the marine environment whilst also keeping the 
fishing industry alive. 
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Appendix A. OFR landings 
The tables below Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the percentage of the value of 2008–2016 landings coming from each OFR for Spain, France, 
Lithuania, Portugal and Italy. For the purposes of clarity, information on OFRs that represent less than 1% of the value of landings during the period 
analyzed has been omitted. 
B. Concerning the Between - Within Theil Decomposition 
The following are the main steps for decomposition of the inequality 















































= TW + TB 
where g denotes each of the G groups (fishing areas in this setting), ng 
is the number of countries harvesting in the fishing area g, pg is the 
proportion of population attributed to gth fishing area, T(LPCg) is the 
inequality index calculated taking into account the population of fishing 
area g and, LPCg refers to the overall average for landings per capita in 
the gth fishing area. 
Table 4 
Origin of OFR landings value 2008–2016, Spain.  
Subregion % OFR Landings (in Euros) FAO area  
51.5  21.00 Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania  
41.3.2  11.71 Southern Patagonian  
41.3.1  7.05 Northern Patagonian  
34.3.1  5.84 Cape Verde Coastal  
34.1.3  5.43 Sahara Coastal  
77  4.95 PACIFIC, EASTERN CENTRAL  
87.2.6  3.07 Central Oceanic  
34.3.3  2.58 Sherbro  
34.4.2  2.31 Southwest Oceanic  
51.6  2.26 Madagascar and Mozambique Channel  
34.4.1  2.24 Southwest Gulf of Guinea  
34.3.6  2.13 Southern Gulf of Guinea  
34.1.2  1.94 Canaries/Madeira Insular  
51.4  1.91 Eastern Arabian Sea, Laccadives  
47.1.1  1.68 Cape Palmeirinhas Division  
41.2.4  1.66 Central Oceanic  
47.1.3  1.56 Cunene Division  
34.3.4  1.37 Western Gulf of Guinea  
47.1.2  1.37 Cape Salinas Division  
71  1.35 PACIFIC, WESTERN CENTRAL  
81  1.33 PACIFIC, SOUTHWEST  
87.1.4  1.30 Northern Oceanic  
34.3.2  1.20 Cape Verde Insular  
51.7  1.13 Oceanic  
51.8  1.12 Mozambique  
47.1.5  1.07 Orange River Division  
Table 5 
Origin of OFR landings value 2008–2016, France.  
Subregion % OFR Landings (in Euros) FAO area  
51.5  26.28 Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania  
34.3.6  20.03 Southern Gulf of Guinea  
31  19.61 ATLANTIC, WESTERN-CENTRAL  
51.6  14.34 Madagascar and Mozambique Channel  
51.7  5.08 Oceanic  
34.3.4  3.46 Western Gulf of Guinea  
34.3.3  2.28 Sherbro  
34.4.1  2.08 Southwest Gulf of Guinea  
34.3.1  1.38 Cape Verde Coastal  
41.1.1  1.23 Amazon  
47.1.2  1.10 Cape Salinas Division  
34.4.2  1.06 Southwest Oceanic  
Table 6 
Origin of OFR landings value 2008–2016, Lithuania.  
Subregion % OFR Landings (in Euros) FAO area 
34.3.1  22.52 Cape Verde Coastal 
34.1.3  18.40 Sahara Coastal 
34.1.3.2  13.23 Subdivision 34.1.32 
87.2.6  11.43 Central Oceanic 
87.3.3  5.85 Southern Oceanic 
34.1.1  4.64 Morocco Coastal 
34.3.1.1  3.92 Subdivision 34.3.11 
34.1.3.1  3.69 Subdivision 34.1.31 
27.14.b  2.50 Southeast Greenland 
47.1.3  2.32 Cunene Division 
27.1.a  2.00 Barents Sea - NEAFC Regulatory Area 
27.4.a  1.71 Northern North Sea 
27.7.b  1.15 West of Ireland  
Table 7 
Origin of OFR landings value 2008–2016, Portugal.  
Subregion % OFR Landings (in Euros) FAO area 
34.1.2  31.20 Canaries/Madeira Insular 
51.8  12.34 Mozambique 
41.2.4  7.35 Central Oceanic 
34.3.1  4.90 Cape Verde Coastal 
41.3.1  4.18 Northern Patagonian 
51.7  3.98 Oceanic 
34.4.2  3.48 Southwest Oceanic 
34.1.3  2.42 Sahara Coastal 
47.c.1  2.22 47.C.1 SEAFO Division 
34.3.3  2.18 Sherbro 
41.3.3  2.14 Southern Oceanic 
57.3  1.94 Central 
34.2  1.94 Northern Oceanic 
47.b.1  1.83 47.B.1 SEAFO Division 
81  1.81 PACIFIC, SOUTHWEST 
34.3.2  1.61 Cape Verde Insular 
47.a.1  1.44 47.A.1 SEAFO Division 
41.2.3  1.33 Platense 
51.6  1.33 Madagascar and Mozambique Channel 
41.1.4  1.25 Nothern Oceanic 
34.4.1  1.07 Southwest Gulf of Guinea  
Table 8 
Origin of OFR landings value 2008–2016, Italy.  
Subregion % OFR Landings (in Euros) FAO area  
34.1.3  53.16 Sahara Coastal  
34.3.1  21.59 Cape Verde Coastal  
51  15.94 INDIAN OCEAN, WESTERN  
34.3.1.3  6.16 Subdivision 34.3.13  
34.3.1.1  1.61 Subdivision 34.3.11  
34.3.3  1.54 Sherbro  
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C. Concerning the multiplicative factor Theil decomposition 
Proof of the factor decomposition for the Theil index is provided by [49] for a general setting where a variable of interest can be written as the 
product of m factors without assuming independence, where μ is the overall mean and {μjf}j = 1m are the means of the factors. Instead of deriving the 
expression corresponding to a given g fishing area, for the shake of simplicity the subindex g has been dropped without loss of generality. We have 
adapted the decomposition to our application here. Given LPCi = LPKi ⋅ KPVi ⋅ VPFi ⋅ FPPi, the decomposition is expressed as follows: 







The Theil index can thus be decomposed into two different components: the sum of each factors’ Theil index and an additional term, usually 
referred to as an interaction term which measures the combined dependence of all factors. Note that factors interact with each other by construction, 
so LPC ∕= LPK⋅KPV⋅VPF⋅FPP and then T(LPC) ∕= T(LPK) + T(KPV) + T(VPF) + T(FPP). 
Based on Eq. (2), it can be observed that each T(F) (F=LPK, KPV, VPF, FPP) measures the partial contribution of factor F to overall inequality while 
the rest of the factors remain unchanged. The total contribution of factor F to overall inequality is obtained by adding the common part to the partial 
contribution, T(F)+ ln(LPC∕LPK⋅KPV⋅VPF⋅FPP). These contributions are not necessarily non-negative unless factors are independent (see [80]), 
which is not the case here. Obviously the sum of all total contributions exceeds the overall inequality because the common part is taken into account as 
many times as there are factors. Given the nonlinearity of the dependence term it is not possible to decompose it into additive functions of the factors. 
Thus, one way of presenting results is to show the partial contribution plus the common contribution due to the interaction term. Another way, used in 
many inequality decompositions where there is a common part [80,81] is to attribute the same proportion of the common part to each factor. 
Although (2) is the most compact expression for the decomposition, there has been a considerable interest in looking within the dependence 
component to obtain the factors underlying it. Here we follow the method used in [49,119] to show the main role of the relationships between the 
factors within this term. 




















= σLPK,KPV⋅VPF⋅FPP + LPK⋅σKPV,VPF⋅FPP + LPK⋅KPV⋅σVPF,FPP
+LPK⋅KPV⋅VPF⋅FPP,
where σA,B is the weighted covariance between A and B. 








Finally, if the variable of interest is not the overall inequality (LPC) but the inequality of a given fishing area (LPCg), just replace the variables 
according to the area of interest. 
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R. Guimerà, G. Guillén-Gosálbez, Reducing global environmental inequality: 
determining regional quotas for environmental burdens through systems 
optimisation, J. Clean. Prod. 270 (2020), 121828, https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
jclepro.2020.121828. 
[38] D. Baccante, Assessing catch inequality in walleye angling fisheries, North Am. J. 
Fish. Manag. 15 (3) (1995) 661–665, https://doi.org/10.1577/1548-8675(1995) 
015<0661:ACIIWA>2.3.CO;2. 
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